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An aided economy
The characteristics of the Transnistrian economic model 
Kamil Całus
The economy of breakaway Transnistria is a peculiar combination of the command-and-distri-
bution model inherited from the USSR with elements of a free-market economy which is 
heavily dependent on Russian energy and financial subsidies. The main pillars of the region’s 
economy are several large industrial plants, built in the Soviet era, which generate more than 
half of its GDP (in 2012, Transnistria’s GDP reached around US$1 billion). As a consequence, 
the condition of each of these companies, whose production is almost exclusively export-
-oriented, has a huge impact on the economic situation in Transnistria. This makes the re-
gion extremely sensitive to any changes in the economic situation of its key trade partners. 
This problem is additionally aggravated by the extremely low diversification of Transnistrian 
exports. The only major economic entity in Transnistria which regularly yields profits and is 
not so heavily dependent on the external situation is Sheriff. This corporation controls the 
greater part of the local wholesale and retail trade, as well as a major part of the services 
sector on the domestic market. 
In its present form the Transnistrian economic 
model is extremely unstable and inefficient. As 
a result, this unrecognised republic suffers from 
an unceasing budget deficit, and its economy 
needs external funds to keep going. The key role 
here is played by funds generated through sale 
of Russian gas, cash remittances from expatri-
ate workers, and funds received from Moscow. 
Given its very low demographic potential, ex-
tremely small domestic market and the lack of 
raw material resources, the region seems una-
ble to function by itself. Moreover Russia, which 
has a key influence on Transnistria’s fate, is not 
interested in the region’s economy becoming 
self-sufficient. Since Moscow subsidises the in-
efficient Transnistrian system, it is able to con-
trol this breakaway republic and to deepen the 
divide between Transnistria and Moldova. 
The structure of the economy
A permanent deficit is one characteristic of the 
Transnistrian economic model. This negative 
trend has been worsening since 2008. Recently, 
expenses have been running from one to almost 
three times higher than income1. According to 
official declarations, Transnistria’s budget ex-
penses in 2013 will reach approximately US$294 
million, and will thus be double the level of the 
planned income. 
The region’s economy is based on four giant 
industrial plants: the JSC Moldova Steel Works 
in Ribnita (MSW Ribnita), Tirotex, the Ribnita 
Cement Plant and the Moldavskaya GRES power 
plant. 95% of these firms production is exported. 
1 Budget expenses were almost triple the level of income 
in 2009, and double the level of the 2010 income. The 
year 2012 was an exception, since severe cuts were intro-
duced to reduce the deficit, and it was thus possible to 
meet 70% of the budget using Transnistria’s own funds. 
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The MSW Ribnita steelworks was privatised in 
20032. Its products are exported predominantly 
to the USA, Germany and Italy. The steelworks 
is the second largest tax contributor, but it is 
also exposed to fluctuations on global markets 
and energy price rises. The company’s situation 
has been gradually deteriorating since the eco-
nomic crisis in 2007. The plant is often forced to 
stop production due to the lack of orders. 
Tirotex is among Europe’s largest textile pro-
ducers. The company’s main stockholder is the 
Transnistrian group Sheriff. According to data 
from the Transnistrian customs service, in 2011 
this plant sold products worth US$163 million 
to external markets. Given the fact that, ac-
cording to the firm’s declarations, it exports 
70% of its production, its income for  2011 can 
be estimated at around US$230 million (it sells 
its products mainly to Austria, Germany, Italy 
and Greece). 
The Ribnita Cement Plant was privatised in 
2004. At present, its majority shareholder is 
Metalloinvest, as is the case with the Ribnita 
steelworks. The plant’s products are sold both 
at home and on international markets. Most 
of its output is exported to Russia. Like MSW 
Ribnita, the plant currently has to face serious 
problems due to the slowdown on the con-
struction market linked to the global economic 
crisis and rising gas prices. 
The Moldavskaya GRES power plant was pri-
vatised in 2004–2005. Currently, its controlling 
stake is held by Inter RAO UES, an energy 
group owned by the Russian state. The plant 
meets the region’s energy needs, although only 
a small part (around 20%) of its output is used for 
this purpose. 80% goes to right-bank Moldova, 
where it meets 50% of the demand for energy. 
Until March this year, the plant also exported 
a small proportion of its output to Romania. 
The Sheriff group, established by the Transnis-
trian entrepreneurs and former militia officers 
2 The controlling stake is held by Metalloinvest, a holding 
owned by the Russian oligarch Alisher Usmanov. 
Viktor Gushan and Ilya Kazmaly, plays a special 
role in the region’s economy. Now it is owned 
by Gushan alone. It is the largest employer in 
Transnistria (with 12,000 employees); the hold-
ing consists of more than ten firms and pro-
duction plants representing various industries. 
For example, it owns supermarket chains, filling 
stations and a mobile telephone network op-
erator. It has managed to effectively monop-
olise many branches of the regional economy. 
According to unofficial data, the holding con-
trols approximately 50% of the construction 
market and around 90% of the fuel market. 
It is the only major Transnistrian enterprise to 
operate on principles close to those of a free 
market. It does not receive state subsidies, al-
though it enjoyed some customs privileges until 
the end of 2012. Sheriff’s annual contribution 
to the state budget is approximately US$30 
million, which is almost 30% of all taxes paid 
by  Transnistrian business, and 17% of total an-
nual budget income. The holding has extensive 
foreign contacts and a well-developed network 
of partners, especially in Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus, and also in the Baltic states, Turkey, the 
USA and Poland. 
Sheriff enjoyed special privileges under the gov-
ernment of Igor Smirnov (1991–2011), and built 
up its power for this reason. The holding was 
able to trade in the republic in both Transnistri-
an roubles and foreign currencies. Foreign cur-
rency was mainly obtained via wholesale busi-
ness and chain filling stations owned by Sheriff. 
The holding could thus take abroad the foreign 
currency they earned without any limits or cus-
toms duties being imposed. Some of the cash 
was spent on purchasing goods, and some was 
Given its very low demographic potential, 
extremely small domestic market and the 
lack of raw material resources, the region 
seems unable to function by itself.
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siphoned off to tax havens. The business prefer-
ences offered to Sheriff changed when Yevgeny 
Shevchuk took power at the end of 2011. Earlier 
(in 2006–2010), he had led the Renewal party, 
which is the holding’s political wing. However, 
he came into conflict with Sheriff in 2010. When 
he assumed the presidency, he embarked on 
a policy of restricting the holding’s influence, 
with the aim of subordinating it to himself. On 
29 December 2012, Shevchuk passed a decree 
cancelling Sheriff’s privileges3. As a result, the 
company was forced to pay customs duty for 
foreign currency exports, or to use the services 
of the Transnistrian Republican Bank (TRB) and 
pay a 25% commission. 
Sources of income in the region’s 
economy 
The major sources of income in Transnistria’s 
economy are from exports and cash remittanc-
es from expatriate workers. These are essen-
tial, since they provide the only opportunities 
for gaining foreign currency reserves. The local 
market, given its small size and limited demand, 
offers marginal profits and has no major impact 
on the condition of the economy. Furthermore, 
the profits generated on the domestic market 
are in Transnistrian roubles, which cannot be 
exchanged on the international currency mar-
ket, a fact which reduces the local market’s 
share of the income structure. 
3 Shevchuk explained that this decision was motivated 
by the desire to stop cash flowing out of Transnistria to 
tax havens. However, it was obvious that the new reg-
ulations will primarily strike at Sheriff. See http://www.
kommersant.md/node/12298
Exports are the main source of income for 
the region’s economy. In 2012, the value of 
products exported from Transnistrian compa-
nies was almost US$700 million, equivalent to 
approximately 70% of the breakaway repub-
lic’s GDP. However, the foreign trade struc-
ture lacks differentiation. Sales by the met-
allurgical and textile industries and electric 
energy generates almost 75% of the export 
revenues. Furthermore, each of these branch-
es (as shown above) is represented by only one 
plant. The most important trade partners and 
recipients of 88% of the region’s production 
in 2012 were: right-bank Moldova (US$250 
million), Russia (US$154.7 million), Romania 
(US$103.1 million), Ukraine (US$59.6 million) 
and Italy (US$46.8 million)4. The significance in 
Transnistria’s overall trade balance of EU mem-
ber states is increasing, while that of the CIS 
countries is falling; total exports to the EU in 
2012 reached US$203.5 million, and to post- 
-Soviet countries US$223.2 million5. This infor-
mation has been confirmed by data from Mol-
dovan customs services, according to which be-
tween January and October 2012 EU member 
states received 45.9% of Transnistrian produc-
tion exports, while 44.9% of the exports went 
to the CIS area within the same timeframe. Since 
2006, Transnistrian firms wishing to do exports 
legally have been obliged to register their busi-
nesses at a Chisinau court, from which they 
receive certificates of origin for their products. 
As a result, goods sold by Transnistria abroad 
are labelled as made in Moldova6. 
The second major source of foreign currency in-
flux to the Transnistrian economy is cash remit-
4 All data is for the period between January and Decem-
ber 2012. Source: State Customs Committee Dniester 
Moldavian Republic, http://customs.tiraspol.net/con-
tent/view/689/148/
5 According to Transnistrian data, total exports to CIS 
countries are higher, reaching US$473.3 million. This 
is because trade with Moldova is taken into account 
in these calculations, since from Transnistria’s point of 
view it is seen as an independent trade entity, being 
a member of the CIS.
6 Additional information that Transnistria is the place of 
origin is often provided on the packaging. 
The Sheriff group, established by the 
Transnistrian entrepreneurs, plays a spe-
cial role in the region’s economy. It is the 
largest employer in Transnistria.
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tances from expatriate workers. According to 
TRB’s estimates, in 2012 these reached approxi-
mately US$198.5 million7. An upward trend has 
been observed here; in 2011 the amount was 
US$184.5 million. Between 66% and 86% of 
this amount is sent by residents of Transnistria 
working in Russia. 
The role of Russian assistance
Financial assistance received from Russia – both 
indirectly (so-called gas subsidies) and directly 
(humanitarian aid) – is, along with the incomes 
from exports and expatriate workers’ remit-
tances, a key element which makes it possible 
for the Transnistrian economy to function. 
Gas subsidies are the incomes earned by 
Tiraspol on the domestic sale of Russian gas 
supplied to the Transnistrian company Tiraspol-
TransGaz-Pridnestrovye by the Moldovan oper-
ator MoldovaGaz. Transnistria consumes over 
two-thirds of the gas supplied by Gazprom to 
Moldova, which amounts to around 2 billion m3 
annually. The right-bank part of the country 
uses one billion m3 of gas annually on average. 
This business generates very high income, be-
cause Transnistria has not paid anything at all 
since 2009 to the Moldovan company and keeps 
100% of the profits for itself8. It is noteworthy 
that TiraspolTransGaz-Pridnestrovye sells gas 
on the domestic market at prices which are 
several times lower than the contracted value. 
The current gas price set for Moldova (including 
Transnistria) under the contract with Gazprom 
is US$391 per 1000 m3. However, the rate for 
individual recipients in Transnistria ranges be-
tween US$75 and US$90 per 1000 m3, and for 
corporate recipients is approximately US$163 
per 1000 m3 (until the end of 2012, the rate was 
even lower, at US$137). MoldovaGaz tolerates 
7 This amount includes only remittances sent by bank 
transfer. 
8 Before 2009, Transnistria used to pay only part of its 
dues. As a result, its gas debt had already reached 
US$1.5 billion in 2006. 
Transnistria’s growing debt because Gazprom 
holds its controlling stake. The existence of the 
debt is convenient for Russia because this offers 
it an instrument for putting political pressure 
on Moldova. Since Moscow has not officially 
recognised Transnistria, it can burden Chisinau 
with Transnistria’s debts9. The estimated pres-
ent value of Transnistria’s debt to Gazprom is 
approximately US$3.7 billion.
Although no official data is available con-
cerning the value of the income generated by 
Transnistria this way, it can be estimated that 
they reached approximately US$272 million 
in 201210. These amounts are not taken into 
account in the budget, and are at the dispos-
al of Transnistria’s government. This money is 
deposited in a special account with one of 
Transnistria’s banks, and is used, for example, 
to fill in gaps in the budget. 
In 2008–2010, Tiraspol used the excuse that it 
could not pay off the debt because Transnistrian 
roubles could not be converted into dollars (the 
contract requires any settlements be made in 
US$). However, in 2011, Transnistria’s leader, 
Igor Smirnov, officially disclaimed the debt, in-
sisting that there was no bilateral agreement 
to impose any obligation on Tiraspol to pay for 
9 Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s deputy prime minister 
and special presidential envoy for Transnistria, an-
nounced in April 2012 that “unless Chisinau recognises 
Transnistria, the debt for gas used by Transnistria will 
become Moldova’s debt.” Source: http://www.rbc.ru/
rbcfreenews/20120418060404.shtml
10  This estimated result was received by multiplying the 
annual average gas consumption in Transnistria by the 
price set in 2012 for firms and individual entrepreneurs 
(US$137 and US$80 respectively). It was assumed that 
the industry consumes 85% of the gas purchased. 
Exports are the main source of income for 
Transnistria. In 2012, the value of products 
exported from the region companies was 
almost US$700 million, equivalent to ap-
proximately 70% of the GDP.
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the gas supplied to it11. The system of gas sub-
sidies also needs to be viewed in political terms. 
Companies which are loyal to the government 
can count on lower gas prices, while other firms 
may be forced to pay for energy bills with their 
shares. 
Funds offered to Transnistria as part of so-
called Russian humanitarian aid are the sec-
ond pillar of budget financing. Moscow has 
consistently backed the region financially since 
the very beginning of its separation from right-
bank Moldova. However, this aid has been sig-
nificantly increased since 2008. From then until 
the end of 2012, Russia offered around US$110 
million to the government in Tiraspol (approx-
imately US$27 million annually), to be spent 
on increasing pensions and financing food 
supplies for those most in need. In addition to 
fixed transfers, Russia also offers Transnistria 
certain ad hoc subsidies; in 2011, it gave US$10 
million for supporting and developing small 
business, and in 2012 Moscow offered US$30 
million to stabilise the Transnistrian currency. 
Russia probably also subsidises Transnistria’s 
law enforcement agencies, especially the army 
and the KGB. However, the scale of such aid is 
undisclosed, and thus difficult to assess. 
11 Transnistria’s present leader, Yevgeny Shevchuk, rec-
ognised the existence of the gas debt in January 2012. In 
turn, several months later in September 2012, he claimed 
that “only cowards pay back their debts.” Source: http://
news.point.md/ru/politika/shevchuk-na-vstreche-s-fila-
tom-suschestvuet-shutka-chto-dolgi-otdayut-toljko-trusi
The major economic problems
The Transnistrian economy is facing numerous 
problems typical of small economies undergo-
ing systematic transformation. However, in the 
case of this region, the problems are chronic, 
and nothing seems to indicate that it will be 
possible to overcome them. 
Transnistria is almost completely devoid of any 
of the internal prerequisites necessary for 
economic growth. Small- and medium-size 
businesses have a marginal impact on the lo-
cal economy. Therefore, a middle class (as un-
derstood in Western terms),  which could have 
become a stable factor for GDP growth owing 
to investments and increasing consumption, 
cannot coalesce. Increasing imports of foreign 
goods further affects the domestic production, 
thus making the development of local entrepre-
neurship more difficult. Furthermore, Transnis-
trian firms depend on decisions passed by the 
government in Tiraspol, which are usually polit-
ically and not economically oriented. 
The scale of foreign direct investments is 
very small. The lack of clarity as to the owner-
ship of assets and privatised companies is a se-
rious barrier. There are no stable conditions for 
economic development or the growth of inno-
vation. Transnistria educates young specialists 
who are unable to find work suitable for their 
qualifications, and therefore emigrate. 
One of the key problems is the demographic 
bust resulting primarily from mass emigration 
of residents (approximately 2000 people leave 
the region for good every year) and a very low 
birth rate (-0.4% in 2012). Since the procla-
mation of independence in 1990, the region’s 
population has shrunk by one-third, from ap-
proximately 750,000 to only 508,500 in 201312. 
At present, almost 30% of the region’s resi-
dents are pensioners, and this ratio is constant-
12 The data provided here and below originates from the 
State Statistical Service of Transnistria as of April 2013. 
The number of retired people has already 
exceeded the number of people working 
in the Transnistrian economy; in Decem-
ber 2012, these numbers were respec-
tively 138,000 and 104,000.
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ly growing. The number of retired people has 
already exceeded the number of people work-
ing in the Transnistrian economy; in December 
2012, these numbers were respectively 138,000 
and 104,000 (0.75 workers per one pensioner). 
This is a serious burden for both the economy 
and the complex system of welfare privileg-
es. Welfare expenses consumed US$172 mil-
lion in 2012 alone (and were higher by around 
US$12.5 million than in 2011), accounting for 
61% of all budget expenses and as much as 
98.5% of total budget revenues. Maintaining 
such an expensive welfare system would not 
have been possible if not for support from Rus-
sia, which pays an extra US$15 to each old-age 
pension paid out in Transnistria. From the very 
beginning Transnistria has had an unfavoura-
ble trade balance. A constant preponderance 
of imports over exports has been observed. In 
2012, the value of goods imported by the re-
gion was 2.5 times higher than that of those 
it exported. This difference is especially evident 
in agriculture. Food imports rose from US$70 
million in 2003 to US$198.5 million in 2011. The 
rapid growth in food imports is also proof of 
the inefficiency of Transnistrian agriculture. 
Another problem is the economy’s reliance on 
exports, which generate an essential part of the 
region’s incomes. Should this source of budget 
financing be lost or dramatically reduced in sig-
nificance, it will not be possible to compensate 
for this by aid and subsidies from Russia, not to 
mention domestic demand. If foreign trade be-
came impossible (for example, as a consequence 
of a customs border being introduced between 
Transnistria and Moldova)13 and no addition-
al external aid were received, the Transnistrian 
economy would collapse. The dependence on 
exports is of a dual nature. On the one hand, the 
13 For more information on the possible establishment 
of a customs border between Moldova and Transn-
istria see: W. Konończuk and W. Rodkiewicz, ‘Could 
Transnistria block Moldova’s integration with the EU?’, 
OSW Commentary, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
likacje/osw-commentary/2012-10-23/could-transn-
istria-block-moldovas-integration-eu
scale of exports from the region is conditioned 
by demand on those markets which are the tra-
ditional recipients of Transnistrian production. 
On the other hand, given the lack of raw ma-
terial resources, Transnistria must import raw 
materials from other countries, which makes 
the competitiveness of the region’s products de-
pendent on the prices imposed by the suppliers. 
Forecasts for the Transnistrian economy
Nothing seems to indicate that the economy of 
Transnistria can become independent or effi-
cient. For the time being, the region’s govern-
ment is showing none of the political will nec-
essary to make any legislative changes. Such 
changes would have facilitated the operation 
of small- and medium-sized businesses, without 
the development of which any normalisation of 
economic relations in the region is impossible. 
Furthermore, despite invitations from Chisinau, 
for political reasons the Transnistrian govern-
ment does not wish to participate in the current-
ly very advanced Moldova-EU talks on signing 
an Association Agreement (AA) and a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agree-
ment, which is an integral part of the AA. The 
government in Tiraspol’s behaviour is due to po-
litical pressure from Russia, which by preventing 
Transnistria from joining the free trade agree-
ment with the EU also makes it difficult for right-
bank Moldova to integrate politically and eco-
nomically with the European Community. This 
also curbs opportunities for local businesses to 
develop. Although the political and business lob-
by which own the large industrial plants favour 
the development of multilateral foreign trade 
co-operation (they would very likely also sup-
The economic model operating in Trans-
nistria is inefficient and can survive only 
thanks to support from Russia.
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port Transnistria being covered by the DCFTA), 
they are at the same time among the fiercest 
opponents of any possible reform of this pa-
ra-state’s economic system. If such changes 
were introduced, they would be forced to oper-
ate in an economic system based on free-market 
principles, with no subsidies, cheap raw materi-
als and legal privileges. Despite their openness 
to co-operation with Western partners, this 
lobby also opposes any possible reintegration 
of Transnistria with right-bank Moldova. If this 
happened, the results of the privatisations car-
ried out in the breakaway republic could be re-
vised, and they could be deprived of the proper-
ty they have acquired in Transnistria.
The economic model operating in Transnistria is 
inefficient and can survive only thanks to sup-
port from Russia. We may expect Moscow to 
continue backing the region financially as long 
as it sees this as politically convenient. It is very 
unlikely that such assistance could be withheld 
in the immediate future. To many residents of 
right-bank Moldova, the Transnistrian economic 
model may seem attractive, given the low ener-
gy and gas prices and the complex welfare sys-
tem. From the Russian point of view, this makes 
Transnistria a kind of propaganda bait, intended 
to show Moldovans the benefits of co-opera-
tion and closer integration with Russia.
